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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports findings from participatory design research aimed at uncovering how technological 
interventions can engage users in the domain of privacy. Our work was undertaken in the context of a new 
design concept “Privacy Trends” whose aspiration is to foster technology users’ digital literacy regarding 
ongoing privacy risks and elucidate how such risks fit within existing social, organizational and political 
systems, leading to a longer term privacy concern. Our study reveals two challenges for privacy intervention 
design: the need to develop technology users’ intrinsic motivations with the privacy domain and the 
importance of framing the concept of privacy within users’ interests. Setting our study within a design context 
enables us to identify four design opportunities for fostering engagement with the privacy domain through 
technology design. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With technologies becoming more complex and sophisticated, privacy threats and violations are inevitable. 
For example, only recently it was revealed that the National Security Agency in the US was capable of 
collecting and interpreting Internet users' online activity1. Legal regulation can vary by country (Baumer et 
al., 2004) but even when technology organizations are legally obliged to be transparent about their data 
collection practices, their communication with users is often poorly managed through lengthy and ill-
structured privacy policies (Jensen and Potts, 2004). As a consequence, there is an ongoing need for 
additional tools that will help users gain insight into how technologies operate in order to sufficiently 
understand the risks they are exposed to and formulate definitions of risk. These concerns have created a new 
design space for privacy interventions that render the system’s operations visible to the user, for instance 
through visualizations or informative alerts (e.g. de Paula et al., 2005; Mazzia et al., 2012; Wills and 
Zeljkovic, 2011), aimed at raising awareness and/or supporting privacy management.  
Despite the growing interest in this field of research, privacy interventions have not gained traction and 
commercial adoption has been lagging (Brunk, 2002). One of the reasons often cited is technology users’ lack 
of engagement with the domain of privacy. This can lead to low motivation when it comes to managing 
privacy or security risks with such concerns seen as secondary, and an impediment to their main task 
(Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Dourish et al., 2004). Although this might suggest the 
investigation of the means of effective engagement as an overarching design concern for privacy 
interventions, researchers have predominantly focused their attention on communicating accurate and 
comprehensive models of risk without explicitly addressing engagement as a design concern.  
The present work addressed this question through participatory design research. Twelve technology users 
interacted with and reflected on a privacy intervention in the early stages of its design. We found that 
technology users, at present, are motivated to use technological interventions only when a threat is perceived. 
Engaging with privacy risks is seen as an undesirable responsibility that can be delegated to technologies.  
Our findings suggest four guidelines for overturning these expectations with a view to fostering engagement 
with the domain of privacy through technology. First, we propose that presenting a rich and multi-layered 
perspective on privacy can be more accommodating to technology users’ experiences and expertise as it 
encourages them to locate their concern with privacy against a larger and more personally relevant narrative. 
Second, interventions that support technology users to resolve their short-term concern with a given risk, and 
at the same time deepen their understanding of the social and political dimensions of the risk under scrutiny, 
offer a way of prolonging engagement beyond the scope of an individual’s appraisal of a particular privacy 
risk. Third, we demonstrate the importance of directed interaction in facilitating reflection into the privacy 
domain. Finally, we discover a necessity for usable privacy interventions designed to be understood by 
laypeople and based on credible sources of information. 
We begin by discussing the theoretical approaches that designers have taken when crafting their privacy 
interventions, using these as a background for motivating the need to additionally consider users’ engagement 
with the domain of privacy. We go on to detail our research questions and the design context within which we 
explored them. Following an overview of our participatory design study, the remainder of the paper presents 
our key findings concluding with a set of design opportunities for future privacy interventions.      
MOTIVATION 
A shared aim in privacy research has been to understand how people make information-sharing decisions 
online, and to influence them with targeted technological interventions. Economists propose that a cost-
benefit ratio, subject to cognitive and behavioral biases, underpins privacy decision-making (Acquisti and 
Grossklags, 2005; Acquisti, 2009). They argue that it is possible to influence the ratio by showing users the 
costs they incur when sharing information. Acquisti (2009) illustrates how this theory might be expressed 
when a user shares their date of birth on a social network site, with the added assumption of a “soft 
paternalistic” obligation to notify users of their risks: “A soft paternalistic approach might provide context to 
aid the user’s decision—such as visually representing how many other users (or types of users) might be able 
to access that information or what they can do with it...” Inspired by soft paternalism, Maurer et al. (2011) 
                                                            
1 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-revelations-privacy-breaches-udall-wyden 
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created a rule-based system that calculated levels of risk based on the information users disclosed, issuing 
privacy and security warnings whenever users shared sensitive data. Context awareness ensured users’ 
attention. In a similar vein, Kirlappos and Sasse (2012) analyzed the likelihood of a phishing attack occurring 
and displayed a risk assessment to users while they made online purchases. 
Taking a different perspective motivated by the situated and socially embedded nature of privacy, Dourish 
and colleagues argue that many technological systems do not support reflexive interpretation of action so that 
users can anticipate how their actions appear to others (Palen and Dourish, 2003; de Paula et al., 2005; 
Dourish et al., 2004). The proposed solution is to design technological systems that can readily communicate 
the relationship between users’ actions and their potential consequences (Dourish and Anderson, 2006). This 
is accomplished by increasing system transparency while at the same time supporting situated action with 
usable privacy settings. Egelman et al. (2011), for example, employed Venn diagrams to demonstrate the 
overlap of social groups on Facebook, with privacy controls placed on the points of overlap. In doing so, they 
addressed a mismatch between Facebook’s controls for group privacy management and users’ mental model 
of their operation. Designers of Impromptu visualized users’ file sharing permissions and overlaid privacy 
controls for regulating the level of sharing (de Paula et al., 2005).  
A third approach has been rooted in cognitive psychology, and focuses on the need for raising awareness of 
practices that impinge on privacy. Based on a hypothesis that an information gap is the limiting factor, 
designers present data collection practices that normally remain hidden, in order to heighten users’ typically 
low levels of awareness. For instance, Wills and Zeljkovic (2011) exemplified the risks involved during third-
party website tracking through an application that recorded and visualized how many websites logged a user’s 
activities. Kani-Zabihi and Helmhout (2012) developed an interactive map depicting the information sharing 
flow of an e-government service.  
The majority of the work described has drawn inspiration from the decision-making and economics literature. 
This focus has meant that researchers have been occupied with designing a model—whether of levels of risk, 
consequences, and so on—and a representation that can convey the relevant consideration to users (e.g. 
visualization). Their main concern has been whether this kind of representation is well understood and/or if it 
has resulted in change. Beyond the production of intelligible representations and controls, however, there is a 
separate question to be addressed concerning why users would be motivated to actively engage with such 
privacy interventions in light of their inertia with the concept. To take this point seriously would be to 
acknowledge that the question of engagement should be posed as a design consideration during the 
development of privacy interventions, and moreover that privacy in the context of socio-technical systems 
should be considered more broadly as a domain that must be engaged with before it can be understood and 
acted upon. 
The recognition that engagement sustains people’s motivation, participation and commitment to an activity 
(Chapman, 2003; Zepke and Leach, 2010) has fuelled research in numerous fields, including human-robot 
interaction (Sanghvi et al., 2011), computer games (Dickey, 2005), and educational technologies (Kearsley 
and Shneiderman, 1998). The importance of engaging people in the domain of privacy is not unfamiliar to 
privacy researchers who have looked to engender engagement through participatory methodologies, such as 
filmmaking or performance art (Coles-Kemp and Ashenden, 2012). In this context, researchers have observed 
that participatory and creative methods allow users to express themselves, create their own meaning, and as a 
consequence become opportunities for learning (Kani-Zabihi and Wattam, 2009). Indeed, engagement is 
considered to be fundamental to learning, and has been linked to deep learning (Zepke and Leach, 2010). 
Even though participatory research can have a profound impact on a small group of recruited participants, 
technological interventions offer the possibility of involving a broader community of people. Yet the potential 
of privacy interventions in creating engaging experiences with the domain of privacy has not received 
sufficient attention to date. In adopting an engagement perspective, we argue that it may be possible to 
overcome technology users’ typically low levels of motivation with the concept of privacy, stimulate deep 
learning around privacy risks and responses, and promote understanding of the socio-political decisions that 
shape their futures (see Zepke and Leach, 2010 for a broader discussion on the significance of engagement).   
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RESEARCH AIMS AND APPROACH 
Our central objective in this work has been to understand how technology users themselves engage, and desire 
to engage with the privacy domain through a privacy intervention under development, using this as a basis for 
identifying new design opportunities for technological interventions at large. Engagement has been previously 
defined as a dynamic process characterized by three key stages through which a user may loop: the starting 
point of engagement when the user is drawn into the technology, a prolonged period of engagement with the 
technology, ending with a period of disengagement (O’Brien and Toms, 2008).  
O’Brien and Toms (2008) propose an inclusive set of attributes that provoke or characterize engagement 
within each of these stages on the basis of which they define engagement ‘as a quality of user experiences 
with technology that is characterized by challenge, aesthetic and sensory appeal, feedback, novelty, 
interactivity, perceived control and time, awareness, motivation, interest, and affect’. Although this definition 
could be viewed as being restricted to the design of technology, it is important to emphasize that it was 
developed based on an exploration of the mechanisms that foster the experience of engagement. Indeed, many 
of the technology attributes (e.g. challenge, control) it encapsulates have been long recognized in their faculty 
to foster engagement (Zepke and Leach, 2010). Furthermore, even though O’Brien and Toms (2008) argue 
that the engagement model generalizes to any technology, attributes must be designed to be meaningful for 
the context within which they will operate, thus suggesting that technology and domain are inseparable. In 
wanting to explore how privacy interventions can foster technology users’ engagement with the privacy 
domain, we use these attributes as a broad framework for investigation.  
In order to design engaging activities or technologies, it is important to understand the people who will be 
involved in them. However, as Deci (1992) points out, people’s engagement and interest must be inevitably 
assessed through activities, “however broadly these activities are defined”. In this work we sought to 
understand engagement with the privacy domain through a set of activities generated in a design context 
centered on a privacy intervention called Privacy Trends. In the early stages of design, our participants were 
asked to take on two different roles. As co-designers of Privacy Trends, we presented them with our concept 
and its design constraints. This allowed us to elicit their ideas on how our application might be designed to 
foster their engagement with the privacy domain. As users of Privacy Trends, our participants interacted with 
a range of informational materials about a particular privacy risk. During this exploratory task, we asked them 
to customize these materials, as they would want them to appear in Privacy Trends. This enabled us to 
observe the unfolding process of engagement and to locate each participant’s interest in the privacy domain.  
The process of developing Privacy Trends was “a means than an end” (Fallman, 2003; 2005), in the sense that 
our aim was not to develop a tool. Rather, our aim was to understand how engagement with the privacy 
domain could be fostered by technology through the collaborative process of designing and interacting with 
this tool. This allowed our team to reflect in action (Schön, 1983) on surprises and paradoxes regarding the 
ability of Privacy Trends to encourage engagement with the domain of privacy, leading to a set of new design 
guidelines for privacy interventions more generally. The following section explains how Privacy Trends was 
conceived. 
Privacy Trends 
Privacy is a concern that confronts us individually as we seek to manage our social interactions (Dourish and 
Anderson, 2006; Palen and Dourish, 2003). It is also an issue of larger social and political significance. In its 
latter capacity it serves to protect political freedom, provides choice and safeguards intimacy (Margulis, 
2003). Motivated both by its individual and wider social importance, we sought to design a tool that would 
enable users to understand risks arising in the context of particular socio-technical systems and additionally 
support them in conceptualizing how these risks form longer-term privacy concerns. Therefore, the current 
research defined the boundaries of the privacy domain broadly as (a) entailing risks with potential personal 
relevance that may necessitate an action; (b) the risks originate, influence and are shaped by social, 
organizational and political actors, and; (c) the risks form the basis for longer term social issues and concerns. 
Our conceptualization of this tool was rooted in, and drew on, recent developments in online media that have 
opened new possibilities for engaging with the domain of privacy, which have not been hitherto sufficiently 
harnessed. The advent of online media has played a critical role in raising transparency into the operations of 
organizations and governments during events of social or political importance — including, notably for our 
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context, privacy infringements (e.g. Vasalou et al., 2011) — by providing timely access to aggregated 
opinions. For example, a recent study reported over 85% of trending topics within Twitter to express a news 
headline (Kwak et al., 2010). Transparency has therefore become the outcome of collective action and civic 
participation (Diamond, 2010)2. Previous design work has looked to support transparency during events of 
importance by prioritizing information cues seen as necessary to address a range of problems. Practical tools 
have been developed based on temporal visualizations of aggregated language from online media, such as 
micro-blogs (e.g. Diakopoulos et al., 2012; Social Mention, 2012; Chakrabarti and Punera, 2011). For 
instance, Twitinfo is a tool for making sense of large-scale events. Users can scope an event by entering 
keyword combinations. The application accesses the Twitter Stream to then display a timeline of language 
peaks that can be further explored by looking at individual tweets, their geo-location, overall sentiment and 
the most popular links shared (Marcus et al., 2011). Another example is the SRSR (Seriously Rapid Source 
Review) tool, which was designed to enable journalists to find and access interesting and trustworthy sources 
in Twitter around breaking news events. SRSR organizes Tweets by user type, location, and network 
composition (Diakopoulos et al., 2012).  
This previous work shows that it is computationally possible to capture timely information when an event of 
importance, in this case a privacy risk or violation, occurs. It is also reasonable to assume that online media 
contributors will write about risks associated with a range of different technologies, thus stretching the 
public’s awareness beyond a particular technological domain. Basing ourselves on these possibilities, we 
envisioned Privacy Trends to function in the following manner: (a) access and store Tweets from the Twitter 
stream; (b) apply event detection algorithms that will cluster the Tweets into discrete categories each of which 
encapsulate a privacy risk or violation; (c) analyze the content of the Tweets and their outlinks to online 
media in order to construct an interactive visualization that will allow users to move from summarized to in-
depth views of the stories written about a given privacy event. Given that online media stories formed the 
content of our intervention, the privacy domain covered in this research was represented by the multiple 
perspectives and knowledge expressed by online authors.  
METHODS 
Participants 
An advert was placed in a local newspaper in the city of Oxford seeking Internet users who were willing to 
provide feedback on the design of a new privacy risk awareness application. Interviews with twelve 
participants (6 females, 6 males) were carried out over the month of June 2012. We ceased to recruit 
interviewees when our analysis was no longer yielding new themes. Participants’ mean age was 40.5 
(SD=19.4). The youngest participant was 21 and the oldest 79. At the end of the session, we compensated the 
interviewees with £15. 
Table 1 – Participants’ technology use 
Technology use % 
Social networks 81% 
Searching for information 100% 
Browsing news 100% 
Buying a consumer product 72% 
Doing Internet banking 90% 
Ordering groceries 27% 
Playing games 27% 
File sharing 45% 
Watching videos 54% 
Listening to the radio or watching TV 81% 
 
                                                            
2 Transparency does not necessarily indicate accurate and complete coverage of an event. It is unlikely that depth, breadth or accuracy are 
measurable given that consequences to privacy risks are anticipated, while the public (and sometimes even the offender) may not be 
aware of the exact nature of the risk. 
 6 
Procedure  
The study was organized into two parts. The first part aimed at broadly understanding participants’ day-to-day 
engagement with the privacy domain. Once they arrived, participants filled out a demographics questionnaire 
that determined their technology use (see Table 1). After completion of the questionnaire, a semi-structured 
interview was carried out to probe their existing level of engagement with the privacy domain. This 
background information was necessary in understanding how Privacy Trends can fit with and influence 
present levels of engagement.  
The second part of the interview focused on Privacy Trends. Our participants were invited to serve as co-
designers for the tool. We elicited relevant feedback from them about their possible use of Privacy Trends, 
with a particular focus on how such a privacy intervention may engage them with the privacy domain. The 
aim and expected function of Privacy Trends, as outlined above, was first explained. Next, we provided 
participants with an example risk and online media stories written about it in order to ground the tool in a 
concrete example (see Table 2). Participants’ desire to engage with the privacy domain through technology 
was examined by asking them to design aspects of Privacy Trends that we had not yet developed: in 
particular, we asked them to detail whether the risks presented within the tool should be tailored to their own 
technology use, under what circumstances they envisioned using it and how reactive or proactive our privacy 
intervention should be.  
As noted above, to ground Privacy Trends in an example, and to stimulate and observe our participants’ 
engagement with the privacy domain, we asked them to take the role of the user, during which period they 
interacted with a sample case. Given the ubiquitous use of the Google search engine, and thus its personal 
relevance to our participants, we chose to present participants with Google’s privacy policy change. Having 
come into effect several months before the interview, Google had consolidated its privacy policies, enabling 
information collected in one application to be shared in the context of another. Participants were shown 
printouts of eight online sources written by reporters of news media, Google, technology bloggers, micro-
bloggers (extracted from Twitter), and privacy advocates (see Table 2). These stories were originally linked 
from Twitter and were chosen after appearing in a keyword search for “Google Privacy Policy”. This task 
consisted of showing participants the in-depth view of each story and was thus in part aligned with how our 
proof-of-concept was expected to operate. Upon reading each story, participants were asked to highlight with 
a marker the areas of the text deemed to be most important to them personally, to explain why and to reflect 
on how this information could be embedded or represented within Privacy Trends. The involvement this task 
introduced allowed us to observe and understand engagement with the domain of privacy as a process.  
Table 2 – Online Media Stories 
Original Source Page Title URL 
 CBC News Google Data Merge Called Privacy Threat  http://tinyurl.com/83sohfl 
CNN Google to Merge User Data Across its Services http://tinyurl.com/7k6vhr8 
Google Policies and Principles http://tinyurl.com/84cr3ux 
Technical News 
Cast 
Google’s New Privacy Policy Goes into Effect 
Today 
http://preview.tinyurl.com/po5
dcx5 
Anglia CV 
Solutions 
How to Delete Your Personal Information from 
Google’s Browsing History 
http://tinyurl.com/orwhbx5  
Tips4PC Google’s New Privacy Policy – Understanding the 
Possible Impact 
http://tinyurl.com/lt64xzq 
Electronic Frontier 
Foundation 
How to Remove Your Google Search History 
Before Google's New Privacy Policy Takes Effect 
http://tinyurl.com/6v9mddu 
Qualitative Analysis 
Our methods combined semi-structured interviewing and observations of participants’ exploration of the 
information exploration task. We conducted thematic analysis on our findings. The interviews were first 
transcribed. We then analyzed them thematically to identify emerging concepts with relevance to how 
technology users’ engaged with the privacy domain, both in their daily life and through Privacy Trends. We 
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read each interview multiple times taking notes on recurrent codes. These codes were thematically 
categorized and our analysis ended when we felt confident that our data was fully described by our scheme. 
Our qualitative analysis yielded four key themes with attributes (appearing in small caps) centered on two key 
phases: the initial point of engagement and the period of engagement.  
RESULTS 
Point of Engagement – A Lack of Motivation  
The engagement model features MOTIVATION as a necessary attribute for users’ initial engagement with a 
technology. Privacy researchers have previously noted that users lack the motivation to engage in 
understanding and appropriately responding to privacy risks (Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Kirlappos and Sasse, 
2012). In line with this view, with the exception of a retired participant who kept up with national news on a 
daily basis, our remaining participants, even those who expressed serious concerns about their online privacy, 
showed inertia in keeping up with new privacy risks. As one of our participants explained: “I am naïve when 
it comes to privacy, which is an odd thing because it is quite important. If I am honest, the reason I would not 
spend that much time is because I am not that interested. That is the crux of it.” When we asked our 
participants how they learned about privacy matters, many of them struggled to reply. In support of previous 
research (e.g. Adams and Sasse, 1999; Rader et al., 2012; Dourish et al., 2004; Rode, 2009), we found that 
new threats to privacy were learned, either by chance (e.g. through the news, word of mouth) or through 
institutional enforcement (e.g. company regulations). Participants’ disengagement with privacy risks was 
further evidenced during the information exploration task: even though Google had featured prevalent 
notifications on its search page at the time of its privacy policy change, the majority of participants were 
surprised to hear about this change. 
Participants offered a number of justifications for their complacency. Some believed that privacy risks were 
not applicable to them and were typically relevant to people in the public eye. Others had transferred the 
responsibility of privacy management to third parties and dealt with uncertainty through trust. In the words of 
one participant: “I think I’ve become a bit blasé about Amazon now and eBay. And in eBay I’m reasonably 
confident it will work.” Another way to avoid the personal responsibility that arises from a violation was to 
hold others liable. One participant for instance had come to accept the risks involved in online banking: “It’s 
going to happen to you at some point if you buy things on the Internet and you sort of go to ATM machines 
and things like that. It could happen to anyone, so… There are always safeguards and protections that if it 
does happen you will get it [your money] all back. It’s not the biggest deal in the world.” Indeed, when 
presented with Google’s privacy policy change, many participants’ worries were appeased after finding out 
that Google was being audited on a regular basis and thus some regulation was in place to protect their 
interests.  
Point of Engagement – Goals of Privacy Interventions 
With the exception of one participant who admitted to being negligent about her privacy, all others had 
installed third party applications to protect themselves against spam and viruses. When discussing Privacy 
Trends, it became evident that previous experiences with these types of technological interventions created 
constraints around the domain of privacy that participants considered to be relevant to themselves and the 
types of outcomes they expected from technologies. Even though our explanation of Privacy Trends was 
clear, when discussing the functionality of our application with them, time and time again, participants 
focused on the provision of automatic assistance that would flag and work out a risk on their behalf, 
suggesting a concern to minimize their own continued engagement. This supports findings by Dourish et al. 
(2004) who found that in dealing with security risks, technology users often sought to delegate their technical 
responsibility to others. To give an illustrative example of this trend within our study, one of our participants 
proposed: “depending on the website that you are surfing it should popup messages that this is a new website. 
Do you want me to do privacy settings for you on this website?” Therefore, when acting in the capacity of a 
designer, many of our participants believed that the GOAL of privacy interventions was to protect them from 
risks, and concurrently maintain their levels of disengagement with the domain of privacy. 
Nonetheless, a few participants were able to step away from this dominant frame to conceive more broadly 
how Privacy Trends could fulfill uncharted GOALS that benefit them and others. One of our participants 
acknowledged that Privacy Trends would not only raise awareness about ongoing privacy risks, but could also 
 8 
empower users by providing appropriate responses that led to resolution: “It’s not just ah look what’s 
happening but positive resolution is…and prevention… explaining to people that it is prudent to delete your 
cookies and backup your hard drives and whatever else and keep software up to date and things”. Another 
participant reflected on how an all-encompassing tool of privacy could transform her own use of technology: 
“Because what I’m doing at the moment is I’m telling myself I have no idea of this at all, I don’t know who 
might be spying on me so to speak, might be using my data, so I don’t give anything out to them that I 
wouldn’t be happy for them to have. And if I had such a thing I think it would be very helpful and it might help 
me be more secure in my ways of dealing with the Internet.” Yet a few others were able to look beyond their 
own use to how such a tool could influence the politics of privacy. They proposed that the publicity and 
visibility of online media stories was extremely important in holding organizations accountable for their 
actions, suggesting that designers build on this affordance by visually representing the magnitude of an issue 
or the exposure it had received.  
Engagement – Time, Attention And Awareness 
Given participants’ general levels of disengagement with the domain of privacy, it is not surprising that they 
wanted to carefully define the TIME they spent on addressing privacy matters, with a view to reducing the 
period of engagement. They proposed that Privacy Trends ‘push’ the information to them as a way to 
diminish any initial effort involved in seeking out information thereby relieving them from the task of seeking 
it out themselves. Some participants wanted a tool that would be embedded in the browser, enabling it to 
identify ongoing risks resulting from the user’s activities and to flag appropriate moments of intervention. 
Others proposed news bulletins and emails that would contain summaries of privacy risks currently under 
review. Our participants regarded the Google Privacy Policy, and privacy risks more generally, as not 
particularly urgent, thus requiring only their intermittent ATTENTION. As one participant noted: “I think it 
would maybe annoy me if it popped up everyday.” In the words of another: “Daily basis, no but perhaps once 
a week yes. And maybe if it is kind of an update you know, that comes to you in an email.” Moreover, when 
prompted on the kind of risks they wanted to be AWARE of, all of our participants requested information that 
was relevant to their own use of technologies. To this end, one of our participants highlighted how important 
it was to have a tool that would span all of his technology use: “…I really wonder what kind of a tool that 
would be because, you know, these days we have personal data spread across many different websites and 
many different forums I would say. So the tool should be something that could encompass all these different 
websites and different forums and maybe you know it could do your banking websites, your social networking 
websites or email websites and any other websites.” A minority of our participants also expressed the need to 
be informed about privacy problems that were deemed important for them to know more generally in their 
capacity as digital citizens. One participant drew a distinction between “local” risks, i.e. customized to a 
user’s technology use, and “global” risks, i.e. those important to know as a digital citizen.  
Engagement – Interests, Challenge and Information Consumption Strategies  
Our study explored people’s INTERESTS within the privacy domain. To achieve this understanding, we asked 
participants to highlight passages within each online media story that were most important to know about. 
This interactive activity revealed a clear trend: our participants marked when the privacy risk was first 
identified, why it was happening, what the nature of the problem was, what its consequences were, whether 
regulation existed and what actions were available. Therefore, participants agreed that certain dimensions of 
interest existed in the range of online media coverage. At a rudimentary level, the outcome of this activity was 
to help raise participants’ awareness about Google’s new privacy policy given that most of them were 
unfamiliar with this change. It also developed their understanding in Internet economics and the advertising 
model often underlying technology companies, which many of them were unfamiliar with. For those who 
were already digitally literate, the information they read provided evidence to confirm their current 
understanding. Participants’ involvement in the information exploration activity additionally strengthened 
their existing attitudes against the collection and storage of information by companies. The most powerful 
outcomes, however, did not come from the acquisition of facts, or the affirmation of knowledge previously 
acquired, but from a more active involvement that facilitated learning.  
In particular, the CONTROL afforded by the information seeking activity, with the INTERACTIVE annotations 
serving as an additional scaffold, helped participants to focus on personally meaningful CHALLENGES. This 
resulted in many of our participants engaging in critical thinking. For example, even though a few stories 
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proposed that one way to opt out would be to stop using Google, a few of them questioned whether this was 
true given that Google had become an indispensable service. Others expanded the implications of Google’s 
privacy policy change by considering it within a larger system of actors. This led them to propose new 
sources of risk such as hackers who might obtain one’s data, or Google employees who might act out of 
negligence. Several participants evaluated the solutions that online media authors proposed to combat 
Google’s privacy policy change through targeted questions: one of them asked whether the act of deleting 
information from Google was permanent; another one wanted to know whether the police had unlimited 
access to the data collected; and yet another participant questioned if Google’s conviction not to sell 
information also prohibited them from sharing data with third parties. The questions posed often guided and 
structured participants’ exploration of the informational materials. In addition to exercising critical thinking, 
our participants engaged in meaning making. They reflected on their own use of Google’s tools, and the use 
of close others (e.g. children, grandchildren), to identify whether they were at risk. This process led some 
participants to imagine new consequences spanning from tailored adverts that impinge on their freedom of 
choice, to a ‘private’ cancer condition becoming visible to their relatives. Although most of our participants 
reached the conclusion that they were not personally at risk, they had become invested in the activity and 
continued interacting with the stories aiming to better understand the social implications of the risk.  
The most illustrative example of this learning journey came from an elderly retired male participant who 
entered the task with the understanding that “personal information” was of financial nature. He falsely 
assumed that Google accesses users’ banking information. However, after reading the various stories, he came 
to realize that personal information included patterns of online browsing. He went on to reflect on how he 
uses the various Google products to conclude that he was not at risk. Furthermore, he proposed new sources 
of risk stemming from Google’s intention to exploit the data and possible employee misconduct. Initially 
questioning whether the police had unfettered access to Google’s database, his concerns were later put to rest 
after reading that Google gave access to users’ data only when a legal case was raised. 
Participants employed a number of strategies targeted at building up an accurate mental model of the risk 
under investigation. Many of our participants wanted to read stories from different sources in order to balance 
the opinions they came across. As one of them noted: “I think by looking at a range of them you may get an 
unbiased opinion. Some of them are quite balanced. By reading 3 or 4 then you will get a whole balanced 
idea.” This strategy also allowed them to answer the entire range of questions they had, given that often a 
single story tended to cover a limited set of issues. For example, the article written by Google focused on the 
benefits brought upon by its change, whereas the Electronic Frontier Foundation discussed the consequences. 
In wanting to obtain a rounded and unbiased portrayal of the risk, several of our participants resisted reading 
stories whose authors appeared to express strong opinions. One of our participants explained: “At the end of 
the day the articles are quite biased especially if you read quite a few of them. I don’t think I need to read 
other people’s opinions.” Identifying whether an author was biased was often challenging and therefore led 
our participants to use a variable set of heuristics in order to assess each story’s credibility, namely the story 
source, author and online medium. Conversely, a minority of our participants embraced this bias. They 
explicitly searched for polar opinions, which allowed them to understand the different perspectives with the 
aim of “finding the truth”.  
Engagement with the privacy domain was influenced by characteristics of online media, such as the 
presentation of each story. Participants searched for stories that were simply laid out and featured clear 
sections or headers. Furthermore, a few of them identified imprecise or unsupported arguments that decreased 
the perceived credibility of the story. To give one example, in reading about the politics of privacy, one 
participant disagreed with an inaccurate statement that had been made regarding US data regulation: “The 
USA is one of the only countries that do not protect the privacy of information that is stored on any database. 
I didn’t know that. I think, a statement like that…I mean it’s almost certainly incorrect. By saying “one of the 
only countries” because I suspect there are dozens of countries, which don’t, but it will almost certainly be 
the most important country that doesn’t. Throughout Africa, throughout Asia, hundreds of countries won’t 
protect data stored on a database.” Finally, most of our participants repeatedly highlighted the importance for 
online media authors to use laypeople’s language when writing about pertinent privacy issues. Many of them 
argued that legal terminology would disengage them with the privacy risk being covered. 
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DISCUSSION 
This paper reported findings from participatory design research aimed at uncovering how technological 
interventions foster technology users’ engagement with the domain of privacy. Our research was undertaken 
in the context of developing a new design concept “Privacy Trends” whose aspiration is to raise technology 
users’ privacy awareness and more specifically, to foster their digital literacy regarding ongoing privacy risks 
while demonstrating how such risks are becoming longer term social concerns. Technically, Privacy Trends 
was envisaged to collect, aggregate and visualize clusters of online media stories written about ongoing 
privacy problems, allowing users to gain insight into a current privacy risk. We invited participants to act in 
the capacity of co-designers during which they provided input into the design of this new privacy 
intervention, and users during which they interacted with content similar to that expected to form the basis of 
Privacy Trends.  
Engagement theory proposes that people’s motivation is necessary for their initial engagement with a 
technology (O’Brien and Toms, 2008). As argued earlier, technology and domain are closely coupled, i.e., 
those motivated to engage with the privacy domain are more likely to engage with the technological 
intervention. In this study, we found that participants were generally not motivated to engage with the domain 
of privacy. Even those who declared to be the most concerned became aware of new privacy risks either by 
chance or through mandatory procedures enforced by their employer. Moreover, when participants used 
technical tools it was because they were directed by extrinsic motivations, i.e., an imminent privacy threat 
being perceived. The majority of our participants used virus checkers and spam filters. Influenced by their 
previous experience with these technologies, many of them had formed specific expectations about the role 
and function of privacy interventions. As a consequence, they wanted Privacy Trends to act as a delegation 
tool that would combat specific risks they faced, thus requiring very little involvement on their part.  
Friedman and Kahn (1992) have previously warned that assistive and proactive tools can limit user agency, 
and argue that designers of such tools may be encouraging users to delegate moral decisions and 
responsibilities to the technology. Similarly, Sengers et al. (2005) propose that technology must not become 
the authority to what a user is doing but stimulate the user to reflect on his/her behavior. Even though 
authoritative tools may be the appropriate response to combat a subset of privacy risks (e.g. spam), many 
contemporary privacy risks (e.g. sharing on a social network site) spawn from individual users’ use of 
technology, and are malleable to personal norms and preferences. In such cases, technology users must make 
sense of the risk toward forming their own opinions and responses. Our study underscores a first caveat for 
those wanting to develop technology users’ literacy and competence with privacy: by designing interventions 
that extrinsically motivate them, while teaching them that privacy decisions can be delegated, it is unlikely 
that technology users will develop the motivation to engage in understanding the domain of privacy.  
In their model of engagement, O’Brien and Toms (2008) additionally show that engagement with a 
technology is provoked and sustained when technology users’ interests are reflected in technology design. 
Our findings show that while engaging with a privacy risk, technology users are drawn to answer the 
following inclusive set of questions: when a risk is being encountered, why it has happened, the nature of the 
problem, what actions are available and whether legal regulation exists. This suggests that the breadth of 
information currently included in many privacy interventions might be too narrow to reflect the rounded 
perspective that users seek. For example, in choosing to focus on displaying system operations to the user, 
Wills and Zeljkovic (2011) offered little guidance on what can be done to combat the risk. Likewise, when 
aiming to nudge users to change their behaviors, Maurer et al. (2011) did not present an explanation of the 
risk under consideration. Our study, therefore, highlights a second consideration: privacy interventions that 
address a limited set of questions, for example by basing themselves within the tight remit of domain expert 
definitions, are less likely to stimulate users’ initial engagement with the domain of privacy or to sustain it.  
In the present study, technology users’ engagement with the domain of privacy was investigated within a 
design activity. There is no doubt that engagement was fostered or hindered due to the particular 
characteristics and constraints of this design context. The remainder of this paper unpacks four key areas of 
possible development for privacy intervention design suggested by this contextual investigation.  
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Allow The Space For Interpretation 
Engagement theory features control as an imperative feature of engagement (O’Brien and Toms, 2008). 
Sengers et al. (2005) elaborate on this to suggest leaving the design space open in order for users to “maintain 
control of and responsibility for the meaning-making process”. In applying this principle to the context of 
learning, previous research has found that engagement follows from people’s freedom to construct their own 
knowledge. At the centre of this process is the ability to exercise agency and control in defining one’s 
learning goals (Zepke and Leach, 2010). Lord (1997) compared a teacher-led environment with one that 
supported students to construct their knowledge and found that students in the latter setting performed better 
and also became engaged with the subject matter more generally. Schuetz (2008) showed that autonomous 
learning, characterized by the student’s ability to integrate knowledge in ways that resonates with their 
experiences, was a driving force in students’ continued participation in education. In inviting participants to 
define what components of privacy were personally important to them, two core characteristics of our 
methodology were its agency and openness. This enabled our participants to negotiate and integrate the 
multiple perspectives that different authors brought to privacy into one cohesive story. In addition to this, by 
choosing what issues within each story were important to further pursue and analyze, our participants were 
able to set their own learning goals and to explore them against their experiences and knowledge (Kolb, 
1984). As a consequence, each of them experienced a different learning trajectory. Basing ourselves on the 
learning prospects fostered by our methodology, we highlight the importance of creating experiences that will 
allow the space for multiple interpretations and that are malleable to fit with users’ diverse mental models, 
priorities and interests. Designers can achieve this, for instance, by exposing technology users to ambiguous 
representations of privacy, or to different and contrasting opinions and/or perspectives on privacy, which can 
allow them to imbue the content or representation presented with their own meaning.  
Scale Privacy From A Personally Relevant Risk To A Social Issue 
Our participants initially approached the information exploration activity by taking a goal-oriented viewpoint, 
i.e., centered on the immediate resolution of the risk. They sought to make sense of Google’s privacy policy 
change, its assumptions and boundaries, as well as its application to themselves and close others. As they 
went along, however, they gradually began to explore privacy as a social issue. Although many participants 
concluded that they were not at risk, they were motivated to continue interacting with the activity in order to 
explore and stretch how Google’s privacy policy fits within current social, organizational and political 
systems. This dual engagement with the privacy domain, i.e., goal-oriented and civic, was also evident when 
participants adopted the role of the designer. While some were quick to propose Privacy Trends as a tool for 
personal safety, others suggested the inclusion of metrics that might express the magnitude of the offence and 
consequently hold the offender accountable. Moreover, while all of our participants requested to learn about 
risks relevant to their own technology use, others wanted to engage with risks that were important to know as 
digital citizens. Our findings demonstrate that designing to support this multi-layered nature of privacy can 
lead to different but complementary outcomes. Developing the privacy intervention as a goal-oriented activity 
can provide users with the initial motivation to engage in privacy, and advance their understanding of the risk 
under scrutiny. Presenting the risk against its complex socio-political context can create a prolonged dialogue 
and engagement, and encourage them to generalize a particular case to existing social structures. In 
embodying this principle, designers can extend existing, context-aware privacy interventions by linking them 
to resources that express the risk’s social and political implications. 
Scaffold And Guide Reflection 
While reading each online media story, we asked participants to highlight areas of the text that were important 
to them personally. This revealed that technology users want to answer a finite set of questions about a new 
privacy risk: e.g. what is the nature of the risk? These questions were posed and answered as participants 
prioritized and annotated a series of online media stories. This type of directed interaction created a scaffold 
that proved to be critical: by asking our participants to highlight important areas of text we encouraged a form 
of annotation that has been previously featured in technological systems wanting to incite reflective thinking 
(e.g. Pike et al., 2009; Rich and Hannafin, 2009). Therefore, even though our study underscores the 
importance of allowing the space for interpretation, it also reveals the necessity of including mechanisms that 
will support technology users to answer personally relevant questions about privacy. Such mechanisms can 
provide a scaffold for reflection as long as they are designed to strengthen technology users’ interests. 
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Examples of guiding reflection through design may include directed annotations, prompts, or storytelling 
applications that allow technology users to construct their own narratives of privacy risks.   
Present Privacy As A Comprehensive Concept 
Our participants’ engagement with the domain of privacy was moderated by the perceived comprehension of 
a given online media story. Stories that covered one facet of privacy (e.g. its consequences), neglecting others, 
were perceived to be incomplete. This motivated participants to continue looking for answers within other 
sources. In addition to seeking breadth of information, comprehension was increased when a story was well 
organized into manageable and easy to read sections. It was influenced by the author’s reflexivity and whether 
it was grounded in accurate examples and arguments. Additionally, it was increased when the author’s story 
was written for laypeople. Comprehension, therefore, emerged as a foundational design principle for 
engagement with the privacy domain and a possible cause for disengagement. In applying this principle, 
online media authors may construct their texts to cover the questions that technology users want to answer 
while at the same time provide structure to the way the text is organized. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper was to establish how privacy interventions could be designed to foster users’ 
engagement with the privacy domain. Our investigation took place during the design process of a new privacy 
intervention, Privacy Trends. Our first contribution is to reveal a set of challenges in relation to how privacy 
interventions are currently being designed. Many interventions have relied on extrinsically motivating 
technology users to attend to privacy matters through the threat of potential consequences, while at the same 
time offering authoritative solutions that diminish users’ agency. As a consequence of this, we found that 
technology users had formed expectations that privacy risks can be handed over to technologies. Such 
expectations were also fuelled by their sense of inertia about privacy, present even amongst those reporting to 
be most privacy concerned. Moreover, we found that technology users made sense of a privacy risk through a 
broad but yet consistent inquiry – ranging from attaining an understanding of the nature of the risk, to the 
responses that were available to them. In reviewing existing privacy interventions, we observed that they only 
met in part the breadth of information that technology users seek. 
The second contribution of our research stems from its aim to offer solutions to the shortcomings it identified. 
By observing how technology users engaged with the domain of privacy in the context of an intervention 
under development, we were able to uncover new design principles for privacy interventions at large. Our 
findings emphasize the importance of leaving the space open so that technology users can situate privacy 
against their knowledge and experience. Moreover, we found that engagement with the domain of privacy can 
be prolonged and deepened by presenting privacy as a personal as well as a socio-political concern. We also 
identified the role of reflection in deepening participants’ understanding and encouraging inquiry. Finally, we 
discovered that our participants engaged with the privacy domain as long as the information they consumed 
was credible and accessible.  
Our research reframes the ‘privacy problem’ by arguing in favor of a shift from approaches that seek to 
influence technology users’ information-sharing behavior, to approaches that will additionally foster learning 
by creating engagement with the domain of privacy. Our design principles emphasize technology users’ 
capacity to be autonomous learners whose experiences are central to their understanding of the domain. While 
our hope is that this research may open up new directions for the design of privacy interventions, we believe 
that the implications of our findings go beyond the realm of design. Privacy researchers who want to create 
more engaging methodologies can use our design principles to inform their methodological decisions. Our 
findings also offer guidance to designers of text analytics applications (e.g. SRSR) by highlighting the 
potential value of developing cues that will support technology users’ interpretation of divergent or 
convergent perspectives with regards to social issues. Finally, by revealing a rounded portrayal of what 
technology users want to know about privacy and how they want information to be presented, our study 
provides guidance to online media authors and public communicators for crafting their stories.  
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